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PRICING STRATEGY FOR SEED PRODUCERS:
EFFECTIVE USE OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET*
Dennis R. Henderson and John R. Schmelzer**
That an effective marketing plan is an important part of any successful
business is patently clear to all of us. However, the daily operating problems
associated with keeping the business going are equally important and often
more pressing, thus marketing is relegated to some dusty corner of our already
over-cluttered desk of management ~ecislons.
Today, we want to discuss, albeit much too briefly, an integral part of
any marketing plan -- pricing strategy. This is particularly important for
seed producers since price uncertainty appears to be the order of the day .•.•
price uncertainty that apparently stems from the lack of a pricing strategy
on the selling side and from a firm, but highly risky, strategy on the buying
side.
The prevailing pricing method in the industry appears to be one of de-
layed prices to growers and late prices to dealers and other customers. The
common practice by producers seems to be to pay their growers some specified
premium above the cash market price, and to allow growers the option of select-
ing any cash market price between harvest and the following spring as the base
for payment.
* D.S.U. Department of Agricultural Economics paper No. ESo-ZIB. Presented
at the Certified Seed Growers School, Columbus, Ohio, January 2Z, 1975.
** Assistant Professor and Research Associate, respectively, Department of
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University,
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At harvest. the producer is unsure of exactly what his cost of seed
will be. As a result, he attempts to delay establishing a price to his cus-
tomers until as late as possible, in the hope that his growers will ask for
payment, thus assuring him of his seed costs before he specifies his selling
price.
While this may be a modest exaggeration of reality, it does dramatize
the uncertainty that frequently exists in the pricing of seed. Yet. the need
for an early firm price to seed buyers 1s readily apparent. Firm prices may
substantially enhance a marketing plan by both stabilizing overall business
operations and by securing additional patronage. For the seller, a firm price
allows more complete financial and operational control over his business. A
firm price allows him to more accurately project his revenues, thus enabling
greater control over costs and profits. Firm prices also encourage early orders
from customers, thus, allowing the producer to better plan his work load and the
use of equipment and other facilities. The buyer gains by knowing, at an earlier
date, exactly what his product costs will be. This is clearly important to his
plans for remarketing and use. Furthermore, an early firm price allows him
to order early for guarenteed quantities, thus assuring himself of an adequate
quantity at a known price.
Clearly, the benefits to an early firm price strategy by seed producers
are substantial. However, the need to offer growers a delayed price option
is probably equally important, else the grower could sell in the cash market
if prices rose above those specified in his seed contract, thus, disrupting the
orderly supply of seed to producers and other customers.
The relevant question then becomes "how can you offer an early firm selling
price, yet ~intain a margin adequate to cover operating costs and return a
satisfactory level of profits, when the cost of the goods sold is not known?"
The answer lies in the possibility of buying insurance against an unfavorable
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change in the price paid to growers between the time a firm price is set to
customers and the time the grower requests payment. That is, to shift the
risk associated with an unfavorable price change to someone else - to an
"insurance company" who is willing to assume that risk. In marketing jargon,
this is to "hedge" your market position. And it is here that the commodity
futures market can be useful.
The Hedge
Letls take a closer look at the concept of hedging. Webster defines
hedging as " •.• attempting to avoid or lessen loss associated with a bet or
a risk by making counterbalancing investments", In our context, we're con-
cerned with reducing business risks, specifically those risks associated with
price changes.
To clarify the concept of a hedge, let's compare it to an example with
which we're all familiar - fire insurance. Through the purchase of fire
insurance, we shift some of the risk associated with a fire to others that are
in the business of assuming that risk - namely the insurance underwriter. In
essence, we are taking a counterbalancing position, counterbalancing the risk
of financial loss due to a fire against the access to funds to offset such
a 10s8 if disaster should occur. In so doing, we forgo the use of the money that
we spend for such insurance. That is, shifting risk is not a cost-free trans-
action. Yet, even though natural disaster does not frequently occur, most of
us find it beneficial to pay the cost of hedging against the consequences of its
occurance.
It seems somewhat unusual that some of us who hedge against natural dis-
aster are willing to accept the risk of volatile prices moving against us in
a market without some "price insurancell • If a natural disaster strikes, and
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we are uninsured, is the loss much more serious than if prices move against us?
The major difference is, destruction is swift and often complete in the case
of a natural disaster, while the crunch of narrowing margins is every bit
as complete, it is only less swift.
Through the commodity futures market a seed producer can hedge against the
risk associated with an unanticipated increase in the price he has to pay to
his growers. This enables the producer to set a firm price to his customers in
advance of the date his growers actually request payment without jeopardizing
his gross sales margin. Let's take a look at how a futures hedge really works.
But first, an explanation of the commodity futures market is in order.
Trading in the futures market is frequently referred to as "trading in
tomorrows". This is an apt description, for the futures market is actually
a market in which future promises are exchanged - that is, promises or commit-
ments to take delivery, or make delivery, of some commodity by some specified
date in the future. These promises are called contracts. Each contract
specifies the commodity to be delivered, its quality, the quantity and the
point of delivery. The price at which the contract is traded is the price
that the buyer agrees to pay to the seller, upon actual delivery. The person
agreeing to make future delivery is the seller of the contract. The buyer is
the person agreeing to accept delivery.
On the organized futures markets, such as the Chicago Board of Trade and
the Chicago Merchantile Exchange, standardized contracts in specific commodities
are traded with delivery dates in certain months. For example, _8 futures con-
tract on the Chicago Board of Trade for wheat is for 5,000 bushels of No.2
Soft Red wheat delivered to a designated warehouse in the rail switching district
of Chicago or other designated point. Wheat contracts are traded that specify
delivery during the months of March, May, July, September and December. Thus,
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"May wheat" is a contract for wheat delivered in May. Because the contracts
are standardized, one contract for May wheat is just the same as all other
contracts for May wheat. Likewise, all July soybean contracts are the
same, as are all March oats contracts, and so on for all the various commodity
month combinations available.
The standardized contract enables a futures trader who has bought or sold
a contract, or has an open position, to readily nullify his obligation by making
an equal but opposite transaction anytime prior to the last trading day in the
delivery month specified. That is, a trader who has made a commitment to, say,
make delivery of 5,000 bushels of soybeans in May by selling one May bean
contract, can cancel, or unwind, that obligation by purchasing a similar May
bean contract anytime before the last trading day in May. And vise versa for
a trader who had initially purchased a contract. Hence, a substantial number
of contracts may be traded without any grain actually changing hands.
It is this capability to unwind one's position in the market that attracts
speculators into commodity futures. For example, if a speculator thinks the
price of soybeans in May is going to go up between now and next May, he would
buy a contract now, at, say $7.05 per bushel and sell that same contract
sometime before the end of May. If the price is above $7.05 when he sells
it, he has made a profit, if the price is below $7.05 when he sells he has
incurred a loss.
On the other hand, if he thinks the price will drop between now and May,
he would sell now and buy a contract back sometime in the future to unwind
his position. If he guessed correctly and the price does drop, he'll buy the
contract back for less than he originally sold it for, thus realizing a profit.
In fact, it is this willingness of speculators to "gamble" in the market that
makes it possible for seed producers to use the futures market for price
hedging.
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Of course, a buyer or seller of a futures contract doesn't have to unwind
his position. He has the option to hold his contract until the maturity date
and then make or take delivery of the actual commodity. Relatively few traders
actually do this, however, and for some very good reasons. First, speculators
neither have the actual commodity nor want it, thus their incentive to unwind.
Second, most "commercial interests," those traders such as seed producers who
actually have or want the commodity, don't find it convenient to make or
accept delivery of exactly 5,000 bushels in Chicago.
Nevertheless, the option to make or take delivery on futures contracts
is a particularly important aspect of the futures market because it leads to
a relatively stable relationship between the futures price for a commodity and
the cash market price. The normal relationship between the current cash price
for, say, wheat and the futures price in May, for example, is based upon the
cost of storing wheat from now to May. That is, if the cash price of wheat
in January is $4.10 per bushel, and if it costs, on the average, 2 cents per
bushel per month to store it, we would expect the May futures price of wheat
to be about $4.20 in January, or tne price of wheat in January plus the cost
of storing it 5 months, until May. If the cash price goes up, the futures
prices will also rise and vise versa. This phenomenon is demonstrated for
soybean prices between November I, 1973 and May 31, 1974, in Figure I. Note
that this diagram demonstrates the stable relationship between the May bean
futures price and both the Chicago and Toledo cash prices.
An important process, called arbitrage, maintains this stable relation-
ship between cash and futures prices. Assume, for example, that for some
unexplained reason, the January cash price of wheat was $4.00 and the May
futures price, $4.50. Arbitragers, knowing that storage costs from January to
May amount to only about 10 cents, could then make riskless profit by buying
wheat on the cash market, selling it for May delivery on the futures market,
FIGURE I. CASH AND FUTURES PRICES FOR SOYBEANS
(November I, 1973 to Mtry 31, 1974)
$/Bu.
-- -- May Futures I'rice
Ch1cago CQ5h Prioe
6.00 J'/'oJ,' '. \ c .> J, .~. 1 ,I ~,I





Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. March April Mav
-8-
store it from. January to May and actually make delivery at $4.50 while their
coat 1s only $4.10. including storage. However, this process. as carried out
by several arbitragers, tends to bid up the cash price - due to large purchases _
and pusb dova the futures price - due to large sales - thus, restoring the
normal relationship between the cash and futures prices.
The priee hedge is possible because of this relatively stable relation-
ship between cash and futures prices. This allows a trader to insure, or
hedge, against an unfavorable price change in the cash market by getting into
a position to take advantage of a similar price change in the futures market.
For exa.ple, for seed producers with delayed cash price agreements with growers,
an increase in the cash price is an unfavorable price change. In the ter1l1nology
of the aarut, the producers are "short" in the cash aark.et. That la, they have
_ obl:laatioa to pay for something some time in tbe futare. If priee aoes up
betweeD ...., aacl when they have to make payaen.t, they baYe lost .,.,..
Hauever, If the price in the cash urket goes up In the future, the pt'lce
1. tIM fatar...rket also rises. Therefore, if they OIM • futu1'e8 COIItraet.
or are "lema" In the futures market, that price increase will allow t .... to
8el1 the futures contract at the higher price, thus recovering on the futures
1I8rket the IIOney lost in tbe cash market. This is the essence of a price
hedge - taking a position in the futures market that is roughly equal" but
opposite, to the trader's position in the cash market.
Let's demonstrate this process with an example. A typical cash transac-
tion ia ~trated in Figure 2. This example shows a substantial 10lhl,
relative to the necessary or expected sales margin" due to an unexpected in-
crease t. the cash price that a producer has to pay on the delayed price
ash_eat with hi. contract grower. Certaift1y, a 1088 of this ....It-'e ~l.
ea- a producer to be hesitant in setting a fit'll 88le. prlee to hle e.t~I'e ,
IIDwever, a price hedse protects hill. against this loss. the futures _r1tet
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FIGURE 2. SEED PRODUCERS HEDGING EXAMPLE --
CASH TRANSACTIONS
NOVEMBER
SELL: 5,000 bu. of seed soybeans for winter delivery at $3. OO/bu.
above current cash price of $6. OO/bu....•..•.....• $45, 000
($3.00 margin covers your operating costs, premiums to
growers, profits, etc.)
RECEIVE: 5;000 bu. of soybeans from contract growers at $0.50
above cash market price with price to be selected by grower
anytime before May 15.
Expected cost, based upon current
$6.00 cash price 32,500
Expected gross margin 12,500
MARCH
BUY: Cash price rises to $7. 50/bu. and grower
requests payment. Actual cost. ............•..•... 40,000
Actual gross margin................................. 5,000
Loss relative to expected margin $-7,500
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transaction to hedge this price risk is shown in Figure 3. Here, you'll
note, the producer took advantage of the price increase to realize a gain on
his futures contract by going long in soybean futures at the same time that he
went short in the cash market through his delayed cash price agreement with the
grower. The summary of this hedging transaction is shown in Figure 4, which
indicates that, with the hedge, the producer was able to guarantee, or
"lock in" almost all of his expected gross margin, thus, averting major finan-
cial loss due to an unfavorable price change.
Of course, if the price had dropped in our example, rather than increase,
the hedger would lose some money on his futures transaction. But, by the same
token, the cash market price would also have declined and he would have had to
pay less than he expected to his contract grower, thus, recovering on the cash
market what he lost on the futures, and again "locking Ln" the desired gross
margin.
Limitations
We've demonstrated how hedging through the commodity futures market can be
an effective tool for reducing the risks associated with an unfavorable price
change, and how this risk reduction can benefit an overall firm price strategy
by producers. But, just as other risk-reducing activities have certain costs
and limitations, so does hedging. These demand recognition.
One of the direct costs of hedging is the margin requirement. The margin
is good faith money which is deposited with the broker who handles the futures
trading. The margin acts as a guarantee that the trader will honor his finan-
cial obligations in the market. Normally, only about 10 to 20 percent of the
value of the contract is required as margin. However, the value of a margin
account diminishes if the futures price moves against the hedger. This may
result in a Ilmar gi n call," or a re.9uest from the broker for additional funds
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FIGURE 3. SEED PRODUCERS HEDGI NG EXAMPLE --
FUTURES TRANSACT! ONS
NOVEMBER
BUY: One IV'V!rj soybean futures contract
(5,000 bu.) at current price of $6.20
per bu $31,000
MARCH
SELL: One May soybean futures contract
(5,000 bu. ) at current price of $7.65
per bu. (price increase reflects the
upward movement in cash prices>. ......•.•... 38.250
Gross Gain of Futures Contract.. 7,250
Less: Costs of Futures Trading
Commission.......••...... $30
Interest on $5,000 Margin
(4 mos. at I2%Iyr.). $200
Total...... 230
Net Gain of Futu res.............•.......•..•....•.. $7, 020
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FIGURE 4. SEED PRODUCERS HEDGING EXAMPLE --
SUMMARY
Expected gross rrergin upon which
selling price for seed was based $12,500
Loss due to unexpected increase'
in cash price paid to contract grower -7,500
Balance... ..•.. 5,000
Gain of futures contract.. 7,020
Result: Actual realized gross margin.•....••........ $12,020
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for the margin account. If the capital isn't forthcoming, the broker is
obligated to unwind the hedger's position in order to protect his own fin-
ancial affairs. thus, the hedge is removed, once again'exposing the trader to
unfavorable price risk. Therefore, the hedger not only has the cost of the
interest on the money he uses as a margin, but also has the cost of main-
taining enough liqu~unds t~eet any margin calls that might occur during the
life of his hedge.
Another cost of hedging is the potential loss of windfall profits that
would be associated with a favorable price change. Just as the hedge reduces
the risk associated with an unfavorable price change, it also reduces the
unexpected profit opportunity associated with a favorable change in price.
While the hedge helps "lock in" a desirable level of profits or gross margin,
at the same time, it also tends to lIlock Dutil unexpected gains as well as
unexpected losses.
Contract size also presents somewhat of a limitation to hedging in the
futures market. Because the size of a contract is standardized and specified,
i.e. 5,000 bushels for most grains, a trader may not be able to hedge the
exact amount he desires. Under - hedged positions reduce the risk shifting
ability of the hedge while overhedged positions expose the trader to some
speculative risks.
Overall, these are modest limitations, relative to the potential benefits
associated with price hedging. Cautious, careful, and well-informed futures
trading deserves your consideration as a part of your pricing and marketing
strategy.
